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“These Illegals”: Personhood, Profit,
and the Political Economy of Punishment
in Federal–Local Immigration Enforcement
Partnerships
Daniel L. Stageman

Introduction: Unauthorized Immigrants and the Rhetoric
of Criminalization
Contemporary criminological research on immigration can arguably be characterized
by its single-minded focus on dispelling the popular misconceptions that immigration causes crime, and that immigrants are prone to criminality (e.g., Graif &
Sampson, 2009; Sampson, 2008; Sampson, Morenoff, & Earls, 1999; Wadsworth,
2010). A brief review of the literature in this area reveals sufficient depth and breadth
of study by researchers of significant reputation—from Robert Sampson (2008,
2009) to Ramiro Martinez (Chap. 8)—that the academic debate in this area has
largely moved past any question of a connection between immigration and crime, to
determining how robust a protective factor a concentrated immigrant population provides against crime (Velez & Lyons, 2012), refining theories of how this protective
factor operates (Hagan, Levi, & Dinovitzer, 2008), and determining its variance
along spatial, ethnic and cultural lines (Chap. 8).
In contrast to this scholarly consensus, popular and political rhetoric on immigrant criminality appears in recent years to have, if anything, doubled down on the
very false equivalency that these scholars sought to settle. Witness the assertions by
national political figures, in publicly televised debates, such as Arizona Governor
Jan Brewer’s that “the majority [of unauthorized border crossers] are coming here
and they’re bringing drugs…they’re extorting people and they’re terrorizing the
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families,” or one-time Republican presidential primary frontrunner Herman Cain’s
promise to “build an electrified fence on the border with Mexico [and] use military
troops ‘with real guns and real bullets’ to stop intruders” (Gabriel & Wyatt, 2011;
Sanchez, 2010). In this rhetoric, popularly held ideas on the inherent criminality of
“illegal immigrants” are extended to encompass multiple dimensions of such severe
and intentional harm (extortion, drug smuggling, terrorism) as to justify preemptive
summary execution.
Such rhetoric is a far cry from the settled academic consensus; nor does it bear
easy dismissal as the narrow opinion of nativist extremists (on the contrary, these
are the publicly expressed opinions of elected officials and nationally prominent
politicians), or mere lip-service to a nativist base; in many states and localities, legislative activism and official policy has followed this rhetoric, most notably in the
form of Arizona’s notorious SB1070 (Chap. 2) and copycat legislation in Alabama,
Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah (Castillo, 2011; Gray, 2011; Guterbock
et al., 2009; Pearce, 2011). While the federal legislative process on immigration
may appear stalled, the Obama administration’s recent high-profile amnesty for
“dreamers” belies a flurry of restrictionist immigration activity on the part of the
executive branch, from steadily rising annual numbers of forcible deportations, to
the nearly universal rollout of the Secure Communities program (Kuck Immigration
Partners, 2010).
Why this apparent disconnect between scholarly consensus and popular rhetoric,
between empirical research and official policy? I argue that the criminalization of
immigrants can be understood best as a function of the economic context in which
both immigration, and the punishment that follows logically as a societal response
to criminalization, take place. Large-scale immigration to the continental USA—
particularly that which took place over the Southern land border from the 1990s
through the middle 2000s—was driven primarily by America’s growing need for
low- and semi-skilled labor in the service economy during this period, as well as the
income differentials in this sector between source countries in Central and South
America and the US labor market (Massey, 2009). The same period saw the advent
of “hyperincarceration”1 (Wacquant, 2009, 2010a) in the USA, with both rates of
incarceration, and the raw population of the nation’s penal archipelago, rising to
unprecedented levels year upon year. In Rusche and Kirchheimer’s (1939) theory of
the political economy of punishment, we find a framework that not only provides
insight into these trends as separate phenomena, but also allows us to understand
them as intertwined products of the same market dynamics—dynamics that, in the
context of the 2007 “Great Recession” and the nativist movement that followed in
its wake, appear to bring immigration enforcement and penal infrastructure into a
functional economic relationship unprecedented in the history of either.

1
Wacquant coined the term as a refinement of the more commonly used “mass incarceration,” in
order to indicate that “the expansion and intensification of the activities of the police, courts, and
prison over the past quarter century … have been finely targeted, first by class, second by that
disguised brand of ethnicity called race, and third by place” (Wacquant, 2010a, p. 78).
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The Political Economy of Punishment: The Social Origins
and Market Functions of Legal Sanctions
Originally posed by Georg Rusche in his 1933 article “Arbeitsmarkt und Strafvollzug
[Labor Market and Penal Sanction]” (Rusche & Dinwiddie, 1978), and later elaborated upon by his co-author Otto Kirchheimer in Punishment and Social Structure
(Rusche & Kirchheimer, 1939) the political economy of punishment is a theory
noteworthy for its simplicity. The theory holds that “[e]very system of production
tends to discover punishments which correspond to its productive relationships”
(Rusche & Kirchheimer, 1939, p. 5). While the language of “production” and
“productive relationships” is indeed Marxian in its orientation, the implications of
this statement are as much practical as they are critical: the shape of any given society’s penal infrastructure, at a particular moment in time, is more a factor of its
economic arrangements than its jurisprudence. Punishment, and the social apparatus for carrying it out, are shaped by market forces and the social context within
which those forces operate, not by abstract legal principles or the theoretical concerns of criminologists (much to our frequent chagrin).
In laying out the evidence for their theory, Rusche and Kirchheimer present a
historical overview of the changing shape of punishment, mapped against the shifting social and economic relationships of the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and
the Industrial Revolution. In the ensuing years, theorists such as Dario Melossi
(1981), Nicola Lacey (2008) and others, have used Rusche and Kirchheimer’s basic
template to explain the evolution of punishment through the industrial expansion of
the twentieth century, the rise of automation, the decline of manufacturing, globalization, and the contemporary dominance of the service economy (Cavadino &
Dignan, 2006; De Giorgi, 2006; Lacey, 2008; Melossi & Pavarini, 1981). These
scholars’ respective interpretations of the relationship between contemporary
macro-economic trends and American mass (or hyper-) incarceration varies, but
there appears to be general agreement on a few essential points: (1) the disproportionate racial impact of American imprisonment policies—particularly those implemented as part of the “War on Drugs”—represent the political establishment’s
efforts to limit and otherwise regulate the participation of historical minorities (particularly African Americans) in US economic life; (2) the isolation of the imprisoned from the American labor market makes it “crucially important to grasp the
way in which the removal of prisoners from the roll of the unemployed [positively]
distorts the perception of the USA’s economic importance” (Lacey, 2008, p. 134);
and (3) “The employment created by the prison system—building construction and
maintenance, the provision of security technology, and the supervision of prisoners—
now constitutes a sizeable portion of the US economy” (Lacey, 2008, p. 135).
Although it should be noted that Hispanics (arguably the archetypal millenial immigrant to the USA) are also disproportionately represented in the American prison
system, the immigrant detention and deportation system fills a parallel and supplemental role in limiting and regulating Hispanic (and other) immigrants’ participation in US economic life—a role that has expanded exponentially on a trajectory
that mirrors the explosive growth of mass incarceration.
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The current study seeks to expand on these fundamental concepts of contemporary political economy of punishment, and further, subjects them to a series of
empirical tests. While it is a given that the broad generalities of theory elide much
of the specific contextual variation in the historical dynamics that they attempt to
explain and describe, theory testing requires that these variations be operationalized; therefore, I examine the specific economic contexts in which state and local
governments adopt the restrictionist immigration policies and practices that lead to
detention and deportation—and give the states and localities in question both direct
and indirect economic stakes in the detention and deportation processes. Looking at
all 50 US States, I draw data from multiple sources to analyze and specify three
coherent and mutually distinct state-level factors (market scale, punitive economy,
and market pressure); I then test the correlation of these factors with a fourth factor
measuring the scale of locally controlled immigration enforcement. Results show a
significant and strong linear correlation between market scale and local enforcement, and significant weak-to-moderate correlations between punitive economy,
market pressure and local enforcement. These results suggest that locally driven
immigration enforcement may be influenced by the profit potential inherent in
immigrant detention, transportation and deportation operations. I conclude by arguing that this influence obscures the public interest missions of local law enforcement
agencies, and calls into question the public interest purpose of federal–local immigration enforcement partnerships.

Punishment for Profit: Immigrant Detention
as Extractive Market Venture
In 2009, approximately 380,000 individuals were detained for some period of time
in the custody of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Schriro, 2009).
With lengths of stay averaging 30 days, the average daily population of immigrant
detainees was 32,000 over the course of the year. These numbers give some indication of both the long and short-term historical dynamics at work in unauthorized
immigrant detention: first, the total number of detainees represents an approximate
increase of 100,000 (36 %) over (prerecession) 2007 levels, and second, the average
daily population of 32,000 represents an increase of nearly 427 % over the system’s
total capacity (in terms of bed space) as recently as 1995. The latter rate of growth
parallels the exponential growth of America’s correctional infrastructure over a
similar period. The parallels between the two systems are not limited to growth
rates, but extend to conditions of confinement as well: “the facilities that ICE uses
to detain aliens were built, and operate, as jails and prisons to confine pretrial and
sentenced felons” (Schriro, 2009, p. 2).
Within the theoretical framework of the punitive economy of punishment, there
is a clear logic to parallel conditions of confinement for criminal felons and unauthorized (and thus criminal) immigrants; however, a number of unique factors also
appear to be at work in the steady long-term and explosive short-term patterns of
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growth in the immigrant detention infrastructure. Over the course of 2009, immigrant detainees could be found in over 300 separate facilities nationwide. However,
Approximately 50 % of the detained population [was] held in 21 facilities. These include[d]
seven Service Processing Centers (SPC) owned by ICE and operated by the private sector;
seven dedicated Contract Detention Facilities (CDF) owned and operated by the private
sector; and seven dedicated county jail facilities, with which ICE maintains intergovernmental agency service agreements (IGSA) (Schriro, 2009, p. 10; italics mine).

The prevalence of private sector and local government interests in the immigrant
detention system indicates that economic context plays a role in setting conditions
of detention for unauthorized immigrants; I argue that economic context is also
essential to understanding state and local immigration enforcement policies. The
immigrant detention market is relatively small in dollar terms: ICE’s Office of
Detention and Removal Operations had a total operating budget of $2.6 billion in
2009, as opposed to a conservative $4.4 billion “back-of-a-napkin” estimate for the
unauthorized immigrant contribution to the value of US housing stock,2 or $70 billion for the total annual operating budget of America’s county, state, and federal
prisons combined (Schriro, 2009, p. 6; Wacquant, 2010b, p. 608). However, it is a
market nonetheless, with multiple private interests and local governments applying
market principles to their competition for contracts. The immigrant detention market presents market actors with two extremely attractive conditions: the first is an
average per diem fee for detainees more than twice that paid for prisoner-clients
from traditional criminal justice sources; the second is that the source of these fees
is federal dollars, as opposed to the state and local tax-levy monies that generally
pay for criminal justice system prisoners.
Though these conditions have different meanings for the private and government
interests entering the market, clear evidence of this market logic in effect can be

2

The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that unauthorized immigrants made up 17.1 % of the total
construction workforce in 2008 (Passel & Cohn, 2009). Average prevailing wages for laborers in
the American construction industry were $680 per week, versus $480 per week for foreign-born
Hispanics, representing a savings of about 30 % on wages alone for those who employ them
(Kochar, 2008). Several factors make the estimate of a 30 % savings an extremely conservative
one: (1) unauthorized laborers may earn even less on average than foreign-born Hispanic workers
as a whole; (2) employers of unauthorized immigrants have an increased potential for savings on
various forms of insurance and through wage theft (Brownell, 2005; Carroll, 2010; Wishnie,
2007); and (3) the presence of unauthorized workers has a clear tendency to depress wages for
authorized workers industry-wide. Although it is unlikely that the 17.1 % of construction laborers
estimated to be unauthorized are spread evenly throughout the industry, it is no great leap to argue
that their presence represents a 5 % savings on labor costs for the American construction industry
as a whole. In 2008 (already well into the steep beginnings of the recession), the industry spent
$296 billion to create $351billion in real estate value, in private residential construction alone (US
Census Bureau, 2010). Using a construction-industry rule-of-thumb that labor costs represent
25 % of total building costs, total labor costs for the private residential construction industry in
2008 were something in the area of $74 billion; thus, we can make a conservative estimate of $3.7
billion for the total labor savings represented by the employment of unauthorized construction
workers, and $4.4 billion for the value, in reduced wages alone, that these workers added to the US
private residential real estate stock in 2008.
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found in the 2009 Annual Report of the single largest private corporation active in
both the traditional corrections and immigrant detention markets, the Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA). Prepared for the company’s shareholders, and to
fulfill statutory corporate governance requirements, annual reports by their nature
must deal explicitly with issues of profit and loss, risk, market activity, and market
conditions. Among the illuminating statements and figures the corporation presents
in this document is a “[r]evenue per compensated man-day” figure of $58.33—up
94 cents from 2008s $57.39 average and representing an operating margin of $17.84,
or 30.6 % (Corrections Corporation of America, 2010, p. 32). This figure represents
the average revenue across all of CCA’s areas of business, including contracts for
state and federal prisoners, as well as US Marshals Service and ICE detainees.
Thus, $58.33 is an artificially high estimate of the average per diem revenue potential for housing traditional prisoners. Even so, it is less than half the average of $122
per day that ICE pays for detained immigrants (Detention Watch Network, n.d.).
Even if we make the generous assumption that immigrant detainees are twice as
expensive to house as traditional prisoners, they still represent a “clientele” with the
potential to more than double CCA’s operating margin per compensated person-day,
making the detention market an attractive one indeed.
The attractiveness of this market is enhanced, particularly in the context of the
recent recession, by the fact that the Federal government, rather than state or local
governments, pays the per diem fees for immigrant detainees. In its required market
risk assessment, the CCA admits that “the budgetary constraints our state customers
are experiencing will present challenges in obtaining per diem increases and additional inmate populations in the short-term” (Corrections Corporation of America,
2010, p. 11). This concern is reflected in the decline of CCA’s average compensated
occupancy over the recession years, which moved from 98.2 % in 2007, to 95.5 %
in 2008 and 90.7 % in 2009 (Corrections Corporation of America, 2010, p. 15).
Unconstrained by the balanced budget requirements in effect in the overwhelming
majority of American states, the Federal government represents a vastly more reliable revenue source for private contractors, another factor making immigrant
detainees a more attractive client base than traditional prisoners. For the county jails
that also house a significant proportion of immigrant detainees, the situation is similar. Faced with the task of paying off capital expenditures on jails built or expanded
during years of rising incarceration, many counties and municipalities have found
themselves trapped between falling crime rates and state-level policy initiatives to
reduce incarceration; they may also have experienced significantly reduced income
during the recession from property taxes and other sources. Sheriffs and other
county officials, from Jefferson County, Virginia, to Essex County, New Jersey,
have discussed these issues publicly; in the latter case, Essex County officials competed with private corporations in an open bidding process to build and operate a
large-scale immigrant detention facility—a bid that the county ultimately won
(Culli, 2009; Semple, 2011a). It is clear that such detention contracts represent a
steady and reliable revenue stream of Federal dollars to many local governments
that need them—Federal dollars, moreover, that may serve additional political and
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ideological functions in conservative-leaning locales. In this context, immigrant
detainees are not simply an income source; they are a tangible prop upon which
state and local politicians can establish both “tough on crime” and “anti-illegal
immigration” bona fides (Varsanyi, 2008).
At the state and local levels, however, both the economic and political benefits of
immigrant detention are limited, to the extent that immigration enforcement actions
and decisions about detainee movement are the purview of the Federal bureaucracy.
Federal control places limits on the market activity of private interests as well, limiting facility expansion to the federally determined level of enforcement, and limiting
the ability of private interests to target local markets directly. In other words, it is not
enough to simply expand detention operations in areas where there are populations
of unauthorized immigrants necessary to sustain them; private interests must also
leverage the popular political will to fill them. In a state such as Arizona, which
fulfills both of these criteria, it is simply sound business practice for private interests
to support the devolution of Federal control over immigration enforcement to the
state and local governments. In a particularly illustrative example of the many forms
this support might take, an October 2010 report by NPR’s Laura Sullivan details the
Corrections Corporation of America’s involvement in the drafting and passage of
Arizona’s now infamous SB1070.3 CCA officials sit on the board of the American
Legislative Exchange Council, where the idea for the bill was first mooted by
Arizona state Senator Russell Pearce, and where it was written, by committee, into
a model bill. This “model legislation became, almost word for word, Arizona’s
immigration law,” (Sullivan, 2010) after the CCA sent a new lobbyist to the Arizona
capitol, and made campaign donations (along with other private prison companies)
to 30 of the bills 36 co-sponsors.
As an attempt to place more control over immigration enforcement into the hands
of state and local governments, Arizona’s SB1070 represents an extreme; as much an
exercise in public ideological positioning as a practical policy effort (albeit one that
a number of other state legislatures have recently emulated). Two other Federally
sanctioned programs4 emerged in the 1990s and 2000s to enable states, counties and
municipalities to quietly take a significant measure of control over immigration
enforcement, without the public scrutiny and uncertainty that might accompany legislative processes. The first and older of these programs is the 287(g) program,5
named for the section of the 1996 Immigration and Nationality Act in which it was
introduced. With the signing of a memorandum of agreement, the 287(g) program
authorizes “state, county, and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to enforce

3

For an expanded discussion of the origins and legacies of Arizona’s State Bill 1070, see Chap. 2.
While additional programs, particularly ICE’s Criminal Alien Program (CAP), also result in the
entry of numerous immigrants into the detention system, I limit my analysis to the Secure
Communities and 287(g) programs because they entail significant and clearly defined local control
over specific aspects of the enforcement process. For a detailed discussion of the CAP program,
please see Chap. 1.
5
Again, see Chap. 1 for a detailed history of the 287(g) program.
4
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federal immigration law…[expanding] the federal government’s enforcement capacities while enabling LEAs to respond directly to popular concerns regarding illegal
immigration” (Rodriguez, Chishti, Capps, & St. John, 2010, p. 1). With $54.1 million
in funding in 2009, the 287(g) program provides direct fiscal benefits to participating
local law enforcement agencies in the forms of grants and salaries, as well as effectively deputizing local police to perform the investigative and arrest functions of ICE
agents. According to a 2009 US Government Accountability Office report, however,
“some participating agencies are using their 287(g) authority to process for removal
aliens who have committed minor crimes, such as carrying an open container of
alcohol” (United States Government Accountability Office, 2009, p. 4). Traffic
offenses and other violations that do not rise to the level of criminal misdemeanors
are also sources of 287(g) arrests,6 which accounted for 12 % (44,692) of admissions
into the immigrant detention system in 2009. Of this total, 65 %, or 29,159 individual
detainees, were classified by ICE as “non-criminal” (Schriro, 2009, p. 13).
The second program is the Secure Communities7 program, launched in 2008.
This program, slated for nationwide implementation by 2013 and funded at $200
million annually, is squarely focused on state and local corrections rather than law
enforcement agencies. The program enables “participating jails [to] submit arrestees’ fingerprints not only to criminal databases, but to immigration databases as
well; allowing ICE access to information on individuals held in jails” (Waslin, 2010,
p. 3). Despite the program’s relative youth, it is clear that much of the recent increase
in annual deportation figures can be attributed to its expanding coverage of state and
local correctional agencies nationwide; it is equally clear that a significant proportion of Secure Communities detainees are non-criminal as well, and an even larger
proportion have been convicted only of low-level misdemeanors.8 In any case,
Secure Communities provides correctional administrators with a means to potentially recoup the cost of detaining criminal (and non-criminal) immigrants: once
identified as unauthorized (or otherwise subject to removal), detained immigrants
may continue to be held in the same facilities while ICE initiates deportation
proceedings. The only essential difference in the condition thereof confinement is
that it is now paid for by the Federal government, transforming the prisoner from a
fiscal liability into a source of profit.
Through detention, and the state and locally controlled immigration enforcement
activities that lead to it, unauthorized immigrants (and other immigrants caught up
in the system, regardless of their status) become the object of economic activity that
is effectively extractive in nature. In contrast to exploitative economic activity,9
which profits from unauthorized immigrants’ labor and the conditions of

6

See Chaps. 1, 2, and 3 for detailed discussions of detention and removal patterns under the 287(g)
and Secure Communities programs.
7
See Chap. 3 for a comprehensive history and accounting of the Secure Communities initiative.
8
Pedroza provides exact figures in his contribution to this volume.
9
For a detailed discussion of the labor market exploitation of unauthorized immigrants, see
Chap. 13.
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uncertainty and vulnerability that keep unauthorized immigrant labor costs significantly lower than those for native workers, extractive activity approaches immigrants as analogous to a natural resource: immigrants need only be present in order
for the various interests involved in detention operations to profit.
While it is clear that the profit potential in extractive activity such as detention is
dwarfed by the exploitative part of the field—that is to say, it makes better economic
sense, under most conditions, to employ unauthorized immigrant laborers at substandard wages than it does to lock them up—the prevalence of extractive detention
is contextually determined and operates in a complex relationship with exploitation
and exclusion (the systematic denial of economically implicated forms of social
membership, and the resultant maintenance of unauthorized immigrants as perpetual outsiders). Certainly, in keeping with the major theoretical propositions of the
political economy of punishment, extractive detention serves a disciplinary function, discouraging unauthorized immigrants from appealing to officials in cases
where exploitation edges into abuse; it also injects an element of fear into social
service contacts, from schooling to health care, that encourages self-exclusion.
Most importantly, however, for the purposes of the current analysis, extractive
detention introduces a flexibility that allows the field as a whole to respond to
changing social and economic conditions. It is extractive in nature primarily because
it allows actors in the field to extract profit from social and economic shifts that
might otherwise be considered roundly negative: in the current case, the twin social
problems of the economic downturn, and overexpansion at all levels of the criminal
justice infrastructure.
The recent economic recession has had a number of effects that might be expected
to shift the balance between exploitative and extractive market activity: first, the
concentration of the downturn in the housing market led to a slowdown in construction and large-scale layoffs in the industry. It is reasonable to expect that such layoffs affected unauthorized immigrants to a degree proportional to their representation
in the industry. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to determine whether
and to what degree unemployed unauthorized immigrants represent an economic
and social burden to their communities of residence, they clearly present significantly reduced opportunities for economic exploitation. States and localities with
immigration enforcement powers and a vested interest in (and established infrastructure for) immigrant detention can manipulate enforcement in an effort to
extract value from this surplus (i.e., unproductive and underexploited) unauthorized immigrant population. This is not to say that the value thus extracted could
match the potential value of labor exploitation; however, it stands to reason that
some value is better than none; therefore, apprehending and processing unauthorized immigrants through the detention and deportation infrastructure can be interpreted as an opportunity to “recoup costs”—an opportunity missed in the event that
unauthorized immigrants voluntarily return to their countries of origin (or
“self-deport”).
Second, sustained high unemployment amongst the citizen population is likely
to increase the anxiety and resentment directed at unauthorized immigrants themselves, in that it throws off the balance between the benefits (in terms of lower costs
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for a variety of goods and services) and detriments (in terms of labor competition
and wage depression) that a given community’s unauthorized immigrants represent.
Visible, stringent local enforcement leading to detention and deportation is a policy
tool that allows state and local politicians to present themselves as proactively
addressing their constituents’ anxiety and resentment toward unauthorized immigrants, in contrast to an (in the nativist narrative) unresponsive and reticent federal
government. This policy tool carries the added benefit of being business-friendly, in
that it is focused squarely on the unauthorized immigrants themselves, provides
businesses an additional means to manage and discipline unauthorized immigrant
workers, and gives the appearance of addressing constituents’ economic concerns
without raising labor costs or corporate taxes.
Finally, local immigration enforcement leading to detention provides a means to
meliorate the many potential effects of the economic contraction on local criminal
justice infrastructure. A reduction in the current scale of criminal justice incarceration
carries enormous economic implications for most American states and many localities. Though the states that have undertaken, or are considering, such reductions—
through means of a variety of policy shifts including early releases, changes in drug
laws, and a renewed focus on community corrections—do so with an eye firmly on
the ballooning share of deeply reduced state budgets taken up by corrections, the
consequences will range from prison closures and reduced arrest rates, to layoffs of
correctional and police officers. For communities that have come to depend on
carceral infrastructure in the face of dramatic declines in manufacturing and other
productive industries, these consequences are likely to be economically devastating.
The unions that represent correctional and police officers—and the public who supports them—will resist any reduction in ways that will be both politically and economically costly, even if ultimately futile. While local immigration enforcement
and detention are unlikely to ever serve as a full replacement for reduced arrests and
reduced incarceration, again, they are clearly preferable if a total write-off is the
only alternative.

Data and Methodology: An Empirical Test of the Political
Economy of Punishment in Federal–Local Immigration
Enforcement Partnerships
An empirical test of the political economy of punishment presents some unique
challenges. Chief among these is the fragmentary nature of the policy decisions any
such empirical test needs to incorporate, and the diffusion of the economic and
political calculations that underlie them. The key question I attempt to address in
this analysis is: how, and to what extent, do macro-economic factors influence the
scale of state and locally controlled immigration enforcement leading to detention?
Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that profit motives exert a significant influence on state and local immigration enforcement and detention decision making:
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county officials, such as those in Essex County, New Jersey, who have entered a
competitive bid to transform their local jail into a model immigrant detention center,
have publicly addressed the economic motivations behind detention policy decisions (Semple, 2011b, Plan to Upgrade New Jersey Jail Into Model for Immigrant
Detention Centers). In contrast, disentangling and specifying the economic motivations behind a county deputy’s decision to arrest an apparently unauthorized immigrant for loitering, and subsequently turn that arrestee over to the custody of ICE,
cannot be presented as a linear process. Such a decision might be officially mandated by departmental rules; it might be an unwritten mandate of departmental culture; it might be motivated on a personal level by the deputy’s ideology, his general
or specific sense of economic anxiety, his sense of duty, boredom or simply habit.
The political economy of punishment, however, is not intended to explain the
micro-level decision-making of polities, politicians, and police, but to provide a
framework—a “field”—in which certain decisions regarding immigration enforcement and detention make economic sense. Any given arrest of a (suspected) unauthorized immigrant may be motivated by duty, by racism, by habit, or by some
combination of all three; to the extent that the arrest leads to direct economic benefits for a particular corporation or polity, and secondary economic benefits for
stockholders, employees, or citizens, it indicates the theory in operation. Testing the
theory must therefore be a two-step process: first, to determine whether the political
economy of punishment operates through the mechanisms that I have specified
above, and second, to determine whether it operates as predicted in the extractive
detention of unauthorized (and other) immigrants. The present test takes US states
as its unit of analysis, and examines cross-sectional correlations of 2009 data. It
must be acknowledged that both the cross-sectional nature of this analysis, and its
reliance on state-level data, place serious limitations on the validity of any causal
inference that might be drawn from them. The clear possibility that wider variation
might exist at the county or municipal level within states than between them, is lost
with a state-by-state comparison. Cross-sectional analysis, of course, can only
detect correlation rather than causation; in addition, it gives no sense of temporal
order or change over time. Nevertheless, a cross-sectional analysis of state-level
data is appropriate in the current context, for a number of reasons:
1. The current analysis represents the first empirical test of the political economy of
othering in immigrant detention. As such, a broad overview of the phenomenon
will support the subsequent development of more sophisticated analyses.
2. The theory is presented in this paper within the context of ongoing, contemporary social forces and policy decisions—the Secure Communities program, for
example, incorporated as a dependent variable below, was introduced in 2008;
the “Great Recession,” treated herein at length, officially began in December of
2007 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008), and was only recently
declared to have ended. Many data that would give some indication of changeover-time in these and related variables are simply not yet available.
3. Many of the policy decisions under examination herein take place at the state
level (e.g., correctional policy, budgetary policy, criminal codes, etc.). State-level
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Market Scale

Market Pressure

- Total population of
unauthorized
immigrants

- Unemployment

- Non-citizens as a
percentage of total
population

- Percentage change in
incarceration rate per
100k, 2008-9

- Unauthorized
immigrants as
percentage of labor
force

- Dependents as a
proportion of total
unauthorized
immigrant population

Punitive Economy
- Incarceration rate per
100 thousand
population

- Incarceration rate in
private facilities per 100
thousand population

Local Enforcement
- Average daily population of immigrant
detainees
- Total number of 287(g) memoranda of
agreement
- Percentage of jurisdictions with active Secure
Communities programs, as of January 2010

Fig. 1 Contextual model for state-level correlates of extractive detention, 2009

policy making creates the framework within which local policy decisions must
be made, making local-level policy decisions (in the current analysis, the decision to enter into a 287(g) agreement or the speed with which to implement the
Secure Communities program) arguably the more reactive of the two, and thus
reflective of statewide conditions.
Given these considerations, a cross-sectional analysis of state-level data should
provide a useful overview of the operational field of the political economy of punishment as it applies to extractive detention in the USA. Within the field, I expect to
see three factors affect the scale of extractive detention:

Factor 1: Market Scale
As the name implies, extractive market activity treats unauthorized immigrants as
analogous to natural resources: it requires only that they be present and accessible
as the passive object of the extractive forces involved. As such, no extraction can
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take place where the natural resource is (1) unavailable; (2) in such limited supply
or so inaccessible as to render extraction unprofitable; or (3) directly or indirectly
involved in other economic activity that is more profitable than the extractive process planned. Mining corporations do not mine coal where there is no coal, where
they cannot turn a profit on it, or where it sits beneath prime residential real estate;
similarly, immigrant detention cannot operate as an extractive process where few or
no unauthorized immigrants are present, where they are difficult to locate and to
draw into extractive processes (i.e., to arrest and detain), or where they are more
profitably subjected to the exploitative activity of the labor market. Accordingly, I
have selected three variables to stand as proxies for the state-level scale of the
potential available immigrant market extractive detention: the state’s total population of unauthorized immigrants, the percentage of the state’s population made up
of non-citizens, and the percentage of the state’s labor force made up of unauthorized immigrants.
The state’s total population of unauthorized immigrants straightforwardly represents the total potential extractive profit—its total reserves, to extend the natural
resource metaphor. Texas, for example, has an estimated population of 1.65 million
unauthorized immigrants; Alaska has less than 10,000 (Passel & Cohn, 2011).
Given an average of $122 per day in fees and an average stay in detention of 30
days, Texas’ unauthorized immigrant population represents a potential extractive
value of $6 billion, versus less than $37 million for Alaska; viewed in this light, it is
only logical that Texas should host significantly more extractive activity than
Alaska. The latter two proxy variables—the percentage of the state’s population
made up of non-citizens and the percentage of the state’s labor force made up of
unauthorized immigrants—are intended to represent accessibility and exploitative
involvement, respectively. The accessibility of unauthorized immigrants is linked
closely to visibility: the higher the visibility of unauthorized immigrants, the more
likely they are to come into day-to-day contact with law enforcement officers and
the citizen population alike. I use the non-citizen percentage of the population rather
than the unauthorized percentage, because the markers that law enforcement officials and the citizen population likely use to identify unauthorized immigrants—
racial characteristics, language use, cultural displays—do not distinguish between
authorized and unauthorized immigrants. Lastly, the percentage of unauthorized
immigrants in the state’s labor force represents a sort of saturation point for unauthorized immigrants’ labor participation: as I have outlined above, exploitative market activity is likely to be significantly more profitable than extractive activity. As
unauthorized immigrant participation in the labor market rises, however, native
workers’ awareness of the competition they represent is likely to rise with it. Though
tolerance levels for unauthorized immigrants’ labor force participation may vary
from state to state, I proceed on the assumption that the acceptability of detention as
a disciplinary tool and a salve to the anxieties of native workers rises proportionally
with unauthorized immigrants’ labor force participation.

236

D.L. Stageman

Factor 2: Punitive Economy
This factor attempts to capture the scale of the state’s established correctional
infrastructure into which immigrant detainees are drawn—in effect, the capital
already present in the state to be invested in extractive detention. However, because
correctional incarceration is a market-involved activity (as opposed to an expressly
profit-driven, free-market activity) there is a need for variables that reflect the
breadth and depth of incarceration’s involvement in the state’s economy.
Accordingly, I have chosen to use the state’s incarceration rate per 100,000 population, to provide an indirect measure of per-capita economic involvement with the
criminal justice economy statewide. For local government officials, this may stand
in for the impact of criminal justice investment and employment on their local economy and tax base; for individual voters, it is intended to represent the likelihood and
the likely extent of their direct and indirect benefit from criminal justice employment and other aspects of the criminal justice economy. Finally, in order to represent the effects of direct market decision-making and political influence from private
corrections corporations, I include the incarceration rate in privately operated
facilities per 100,000 population statewide. The higher the per-capita private incarceration rate, the broader the economic impact (and the stronger the political influence) of decisions taken by private corrections corporations is likely to be.

Factor 3: Market Pressure
Whereas the market scale for extractive othering represents the long-term economic
viability of extractive detention activity in the state, market pressure represents the
short-term push–pull factors that should be expected to (1) push unauthorized immigrants out of the labor market and the more profitable exploitative area of the field;
and (2) pull these immigrants (as detainees) into the existing criminal justice infrastructure. Short-term fluctuations in the labor market—represented here by the
proxy variable of the state’s official unemployment rate—can generally be expected
to affect unauthorized workers proportionally. Secondarily, they may also lead to
heightened short-term anxiety on the part of the state’s native workers, affecting
voting patterns and political support for local enforcement and detention accordingly. Conversely, short-term fluctuations in the activity of the state’s criminal justice infrastructure—represented by the year-on-year percentage change in the
state’s incarceration rate per 100,000—should be expected to relate negatively to
support for local enforcement and detention efforts. That is, where incarceration is
dropping, state and local officials will be exploring alternative means to fill empty
cells and preserve the positive primary and secondary economic impact that criminal justice institutions bring to local communities—and they may well be supported
in these efforts by law enforcement and correctional officers unions, as well as other
economically motivated advocacy groups. A third variable—the proportion of the
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state’s unauthorized immigrant population not participating in the labor force—
serves a dual role within this factor, first complementing the “pull” factor of unemployment, and second, representing the proportion of unauthorized dependents (and
other individuals not participating in the labor force) who can be drawn into extractive market activity without any net effect on potential exploitative activity.

Factor 4: (Dependent) Local Enforcement and Detention
Given the theoretical construction of independent proxy variables into broader
underlying factors, it is both conceptually and methodologically appropriate to treat
the dependent variables of interest in a similar fashion. Detention itself—represented
by the state’s average daily population of detainees—is, within the theoretical
framework of the political economy of punishment, the benefit-producing end of
any local enforcement initiative; however, given that its distribution remains subject
to federal enforcement decision-making and activity, it is by itself an imperfect
measure of state-level local enforcement scale. It is supplemented here through the
inclusion of the state’s raw number of active 287(g) memoranda of understanding,
and the proportion of the state’s criminal justice jurisdictions actively participating
in the Secure Communities Program.
Factor analysis presents the most appropriate statistical technique to test for the
presence of, and relationships amongst, these factors within the current 50-state
data set. Theoretically and conceptually, it is uniquely suited to revealing the underlying contextual patterns and associations that should set the field for extractive
detention; methodologically, it serves to standardize a set of variables that are, in
their raw forms, expressed in disparate and difficult to reconcile terms (from raw
populations and proportions to rates and averages). Additionally, oblique (oblimin)
factor analysis reveals the correlations between these underlying factors. This in
effect holds the other factors constant—an essential feature where the variables of
interest have highly skewed distributions and a high prevalence of zeros that render
traditional OLS regression unfeasible (Table 1).

Findings, Part 1: Factor Analysis
Table 2 presents the relevant statistics for the factor analysis of variables expected
to predict the scale of extractive detention. In general, the analysis provides strong
support for the presence of the factors outlined above, and the distribution of variables within each factor supports the theoretical specifications of the political economy of punishment. The model explains 71 % of the total variance amongst the
eight variables included, and with complete data from all 50 US states, the analysis
fits well within the widely accepted tolerance of 5–20 cases per variable. In addition,

Table 1 Descriptive statistics for variables of interest, 50 US states, 2009
Variable
Mean
SD
Min.
Max.
Market scale
Total population of unauthorized immigrants
228
434
10
2,550
(in thousands)
Non-citizens as a proportion of total population
0.048
0.032
0.007
0.146
Unauthorized immigrants as a proportion
0.038
0.024
0.005
0.100
of total labor force
Market pressure
Proportion of labor force unemployed
0.085
0.020
0.043
0.133
Proportional year-on-year change
0.001
0.030 −0.092
0.054
in prison population
Proportion of unauthorized population
0.246
0.122
0.000
0.430
not participating in labor force
Punitive economy
Incarceration rate per 100 thousand population
409
147
151
866
Incarceration rate in private facilities
40.3
58.5
0
194
per 100 thousand population
Local enforcement and detention
Average daily population of detained immigrants 673
1,421
0
8,809
Total number of 287(g) memoranda
1.32
2.24
0
9
of understanding
Proportion of jurisdiction with active Secure
0.032
0.083
0.000
0.470
Communities programs
Table 2 Factor loadings for variables implicated in extractive othering
Loading

Code
undocpop
noncitperc
undoclabpc
unemp
incchg
undocdeppc
incperk
privrtperk
Eigenvalue

Factor 2: Factor 3:
Factor 1:
punitive market
Variable
market scale economy pressure
Total population of unauthorized immigrants
0.844
Non-citizens as a proportion of total population 0.955
Unauthorized immigrants as a proportion of
0.943
total labor force
Proportion of labor force unemployed
0.780
Proportional year-on-year change in prison
−0.726
population
Proportion of unauth. pop. not participating in
0.680
labor force
Incarceration rate per 100,000 population
0.847
Incarceration rate in private facilities per
0.732
100,000 population
2.865
1.571
1.279

% of variance
(% of total
variance
explained)
Component correlation matrix
Factor 1: market scale
Factor 2: punitive economy
Factor 3: market pressure

35.811
71.440

19.638

15.991

1.000
0.064
0.167

0.064
1.000
−0.035

0.167
−0.035
1.000
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Table 3 Factor loadings for dependent variables: local enforcement and detention
Loading
Code
detadp
gmoacount
activscperc
Eigenvalue
% of variance

Variable
Average daily population of detained
immigrants
Count of 287(g) memoranda of understanding
Proportion of jurisdictions with Secure
Communities programs

Factor 1: local enforcement
and detention
0.907
0.778
0.755
1.999
66.617

the factors are largely distinct, with the highest correlation (0.167) arising between
the market scale and market pressure factors, and a minuscule negative correlation
(−0.035) between the market pressure and punitive economy factors.
This implies that the normal scores for each state on the three factors are generally uncorrelated, and can thus be used to further analyze their correlation with the
dependent variable of interest (local enforcement and detention), with confidence
that each factor represents the distinct aspect of the theory specified. As for the
individual variables included in the model, the smallest absolute loading is 0.680,
indicating that the factor (market pressure) explains 68 % of total variance in the
variable, in this case the proportion of the state’s unauthorized immigrant population not participating in the labor force.
Table 3 presents the factor loadings for the dependent variable of interest, local
enforcement and detention. While the amount of variance in the three constituent
variables explained by the factor—66.6 %—is less than the 71 % explained by the
factors in the first model, it is clear that this larger variance is driven by the degree
to which local enforcement initiatives (loading at 0.778 and 0.755, respectively) are
out of step with detention itself (loading at 0.907). This variance can likely be
explained by two distinct circumstances: first, the degree to which entry into a
287(g) agreement may be ideologically driven, economically speculative, or driven
by the promise of enforcement-side economic rewards. Law enforcement officials
in counties and municipalities with very low populations of unauthorized immigrants might enter into 287(g) for the free trainings and in-kind subsidies that such
agreements carry, without the agreement leading to a notable increase in the state or
local population of detained immigrants. Secondly, the relative youth of the Secure
Communities Program—and the fact that many jurisdictions did not enter the program until late in 2009—means that the program itself would be unlikely to be
significantly related to an increase in the population of detained immigrants until
2010 or later. Given these issues, the 66.6 % association of detention and local
enforcement variables implies that the factor is a viable dependent variable for
further analysis.
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Findings, Part 2: Crosstabular Correlations
As discussed above, the non-normal distributions and the prevalence of null values
in both the independent and dependent variables included in the model make measuring association through standard OLS regression unfeasible. As an alternative,
each factor has been divided into pentile ranks, the mean values for individual variables of which are shown in Table 4. The categorical ranks of each independent
factor are then crosstabulated separately with the rank-ordered local enforcement
factor, and tested with (1) Fisher’s exact test to measure significance; and (2)
Cramer’s V and (3) Kendall’s tau-b as measures of association. Fisher’s exact test
is used rather than a standard chi-square, because the observed-expected values in a
great many cells are less than 5; as such, an exact test can be interpreted with much
greater confidence than an asymptotic estimate. Cramer’s V provides a measure of
the raw (nominal) association of the two variables examined (in other words, the

Table 4 Extractive economic othering: mean variable values by factor score pentile
Variable
Market scale
Total population of unauthorized
immigrants (in thousands)
Non-citizens as a proportion
of total population
Unauthorized immigrants as a
proportion of total labor force
Market pressure
Proportion of labor force unemployed
Proportional year-on-year change
in prison population
Proportion of unauthorized population
not participating in labor force

Factor score pentile
1 (lowest) 2
23.5

85.5

3

4
67.5a

5 (highest)

162

801.5

0.0168

0.0246

0.0389

0.0631

0.0971

0.0105

0.0224

0.0327

0.0481

0.0748

0.0692
0.025

0.0718
0.0123

0.0813
0.0137a

0.0954
−0.0117

0.1048
−0.0325

0.0446

0.2653

0.3187

0.2739a

0.3274

Punitive economy
Incarceration rate per 100 thousand
226.3
353.4
434.8
448.8
580.5
population
Incarceration rate in private facilities
1.67
7.21
13.82
65.82
112.8
per 100 thousand population
Local enforcement and detention
Average daily population of detained
14
135
354
516
2,348
immigrants
0.1
0.7
1.5
4.3
Total number of 287(g) memoranda
0b
of understanding
0.001
0.002
0.018
0.138
Proportion of jurisdiction with active
0.0b
Secure Communities programs
a
Denotes a deviation from ordinal scale on the mean value of this variable by pentile rank, due to
variance in this factor not explained by the model presented
b
Values of this variable for all cases in pentile one are 0
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Table 5 Crosstabular correlations of ranked extractive economic othering factors with ranked
local enforcement factor
Fisher’s exact test
Cramer’s V
Kendall’s tau-b
Independent
factor variable
Statistic Significance
Value Significance
Value Significance
Market scale
33.841
0.000
0.469 0.000
0.558 0.000a
Punitive economy 23.147
0.051
0.354 0.075
0.217 0.071a
Market pressure
41.008
0.000
0.520 0.000
0.220 0.056a
a
Approximate significance (exact significance could not be computed with available memory)

strength of the relationship regardless of direction), and Kendall’s tau-b measures
the directional association of the ranked factors (the degree to which one factor rises
and falls with the other).
Table 5 reveals clear support for the political economy of punishment in locally
controlled immigration enforcement leading to detention; specifically, the tests
appear to indicate that macro-economic factors influence the scale of these operations at the state level, lending support to the extractive interpretation outlined
above. Significant relationships are found between each of the three macro-economic
factors and the local enforcement and detention factor. Additionally, the Kendall’s
tau-b statistics show a strong linear relationship between market scale and local
enforcement, and weak-to-moderate linear relationships (significant at the 0.1 level)
between local enforcement rank and the other two ranked factors (Table 6).
The strength and significance of these correlations shows that the relative scale of
each factor as constructed has some relationship with the relative scale of locally
controlled immigration enforcement in a given US state. The limitations of the statistical instruments do not allow for a comprehensive exploration of how the independent factors act upon local control in tandem; nor can they test the interactions
between factors, or their relative weight in influencing local enforcement policy. They
do, however, present a clear argument for the consideration of economic context—
specifically, the potential for direct extractive profit in place of labor-market exploitation, and the evolving economic role of the criminal justice system—when predicting
and analyzing state and local level immigration enforcement decisions.

Discussion: Policy Innovation, Harm, and the Public Good
The above analysis establishes a clear empirical relationship between state-level
local enforcement and detention activity, and the pursuit of direct economic benefit
through this activity by corporate and local government actors. In doing so, it raises
the fundamental question of whether, and to what extent, economic decision-making
has a justifiable role in immigration policy. Numerous justifications have been cited
for the increasingly aggressive detention and deportation policies of recent years, as
well as for the increasing pace at which enforcement functions are being rescaled to
the state and local level; the official justification for the federally mandated 287(g)

Market scale (factor score rank)
Total population of unauthorized immigrants (in thousands)
Non-citizens as a proportion of total population
Unauthorized immigrants as a proportion of total labor force
Market pressure (factor score rank)
Proportion of labor force unemployed
Proportional year-on-year change in prison population
Proportion of unauthorized population not participating in labor force
Punitive economy (factor score rank)
Incarceration rate per 100 thousand population
Incarceration rate in private facilities per 100 thousand population
Local enforcement and detention
Average daily population of detained immigrants
Total number of 287(g) memoranda of understanding
Proportion of jurisdiction with active Secure Communities programs

Variable
State (abbrev.)
1
10
0.016
0.015
1
0.050
0.028
0.00
3
425
1.97
11
0
0.00

1
10
0.007
0.005
1
0.077
0.051
0.00
2
341
0
7
0
0.00

75
0
0.00

2
80
0.020
0.026
5
0.107
−0.003
0.31
4
484
51.3
165
0
0.00

2
75
0.025
0.032
4
0.104
0.017
0.27
2
281
0
180
1
0.00

1
55
0.020
0.013
5
0.096
−0.056
0.27
3
516
0
248
1
0.00

3
85
0.038
0.021
3
0.081
0.008
0.29
1
191
7.67

530
2
0.00

3
120
0.022
0.042
1
0.078
0.054
0.21
5
637
0

663
2
0.00

4
180
0.065
0.046
4
0.083
−0.021
0.33
4
464
107

Factor score pentile rank (local enforcement and detention)
1 (lowest)
2
3
4
WV
SD
KY
IA
MO
MN AL
CO

Table 6 Variable values for median cases by local enforcement and detention factor score pentile

619
9
0.02

4
210
0.056
0.039
1
0.069
0.049
0.24
4
487
20

3449
1
0.14

5
2,550
0.146
0.097
4
0.113
−0.014
0.27
3
460
7.18

5 (highest)
VA
CA
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and Secure Communities programs is to allow local law enforcement and correctional agencies to be more responsive to the “problem” of unauthorized immigration
at the local level, and to act as a “force multiplier” in pursuit of a solution. Such a
justification frames detention and deportation as an intrinsic public good, that can
be made responsive to local needs. To the extent that such rescaling facilitates the
concentration of economic benefits within a more or less narrowly circumscribed
community within the locality in question, this justification is perhaps defensible—
provided the explicit acknowledgement that such a defense requires a straightforwardly exclusionary redefinition of the “public,” nakedly privileging the economic
concerns of that locality’s political and social establishment over the quality of life
(and freedom) of those others who may live in the community, but are not of it,
those outsiders upon whose labor a significant proportion of the community’s
wealth may be built.10
A more broadly defined and inclusive notion of the public good, when considering the protective functions of the state, requires the contrasting notion of a specific
harm against which the public must be protected. The notion that unauthorized
immigration represents such a harm is a debatable one; whatever one’s stance in this
debate, however, it is clear that the movement of labor across borders is treated very
differently from the parallel movement of capital, with which it is in fact inextricably intertwined (Massey, 2009; Stageman, 2011). It is important to acknowledge
that the ramping up of deportation to record-breaking levels year upon year has now
become a phenomenon untethered to the reality of these cross-border movements;
with only an estimated 300,000 immigrants crossing the nation’s southern land border without authorization, deportations in 2009 outstripped unauthorized entries by
as much as 100,000 (Passel & Cohn, 2010). This difference has only grown in the
years since.
If such a trajectory continues, the typical character of deportations will change
markedly in the coming years, as the pool of newly arrived unauthorized immigrants shrinks, and the average deportee becomes a progressively longer-term resident. The potential collateral effects of tearing such individuals from their partners,
children, extended families, and social networks has been explored in heartrending
detail by other contributors to this volume,11 indicating the clear social cost of detention and deportation operations—a cost that can only rise as the years pass. These
are costs for which the market consistently fails to account. As scholars, however,
we are uniquely positioned to quantify these costs, to describe them, and to contrast
them with a market logic concerned chiefly with innovating in the pursuit of profits,
no matter how narrowly held or bereft of social benefit.

10

For an in-depth discussion of the quality-of-life effects of this legally imposed outsider status on
immigrant communities, Hagan & Phillips, 2008).
11
Specifically, Fenix Arias (Chap. 6) details the social costs for family members left behind, while
Yolanda Martin’s (Chap. 5) focuses on the steep costs for deportees themselves.
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